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In this paper, we empirically analyze the factors affecting the cross section of mutual fund fee dis-
persion. In the context of equity mutual funds, fee dispersion stems primarily from the heterogenei-
ty of products, clienteles and production functions. However, the relevant theory predicts that 
search costs can also generate fee dispersion. By controlling for observable sources of heterogenei-
ty, we find that fee dispersion decreases with fund size and age, as well as with the amount of assets 
under management of the investment company. In addition, we find lower levels of fee dispersion 
for funds that charge marketing and distribution fees. Although we cannot rule out the possibility 
that these factors are a proxy for some unobserved source of heterogeneity, our results are also con-
sistent with the theoretical prediction that search costs positively affect fee dispersion.  
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Price dispersion for homogenous products is abundantly documented in the economic litera-
ture for different categories of consumer goods and is considered to be an indirect measure of 
market inefficiency. Prices are dispersed when market participants charge non-marginal pric-
es for homogeneous products. Price dispersion is also documented in homogeneous invest-
ment services such as money market funds (Christoffersen and Musto, 2002) and index funds 
(Hortaçsu and Syverson, 2004). Christoffersen and Musto (2002) focus on money market 
funds and attribute fee dispersion to the heterogeneity of investors in terms of performance 
sensitivity. Funds that cater to less sensitive investors can charge higher fees for the same 
service than those that cater to more performance-sensitive investors. Hortaçsu and Syverson 
(2004) attribute the existence of price dispersion among S&P 500 index funds to the non-
portfolio-related salient characteristics of the funds, switching costs and search costs. 
Although US equity mutual funds do not offer a homogeneous investment service, Carhart 
(1997) shows that their price dispersion is not explained by the ex-post performance of the 
portfolio. Differences in expenses explain most of the variation in after-expense performance, 
thus suggesting that there is no positive relationship between the expense ratio and the gross 
performance of the portfolio. Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú (2009) show a negative relationship 
between gross performance and expenses after controlling for a number of funds’ salient cha-
racteristics. Apart from the puzzle of the negative correlation with past performance, we can 
generally observe significant price dispersion. For example, Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004) 
report that the fees of a large sample of growth and income funds from 2000 have a coeffi-
cient of variation of 0.830 (at an average cost of 158.4 basis points), with a 90th to 10th per-
centile ratio of 5.5. In addition, the correlation between fees and performance is not signifi-
cantly different from zero. 
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In this paper, we empirically analyze the factors affecting price dispersion in a sample of US 
equity funds. In contrast to previous studies on fee dispersion in mutual funds, the “products” 
in our sample can hardly be considered homogeneous. US equity funds differ in terms of 
portfolio composition, return, risk and other portfolio-related characteristics. Fund managers 
with greater stock selection ability should be able to charge more for their services (Chevalier 
and Ellison, 1999). Thus, if mutual fund managers have different degrees of investment abili-
ty, a certain degree of fee dispersion is to be expected (Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú, 2009). 
Moreover, economic theory suggests that heterogeneity of clienteles and production functions 
can generate price dispersion. As far as clientele heterogeneity is concerned, Salop and Stig-
litz (1977) show that price dispersion may occur when “agents differ in their ability and wil-
lingness to make economical decisions in the market-place.” In a similar vein, Stahl (1989) 
analyzes investors with different degrees of ability to search among sellers for better prices. 
When buyers are assumed to be identical, price dispersion can arise from heterogeneity 
among producers. Reinganum (1979), for example, shows that price dispersion can exist if 
firms have heterogeneous marginal costs. Of course, the two forms of heterogeneity (clientele 
and production function) are not mutually exclusive: both Carlson and McAfee (1983) and 
Benabou (1993) develop models where heterogeneities on both sides of the market cooperate 
in order to create equilibrium price dispersion. 
Finally, a possible source of dispersion is the presence of search costs. Stigler (1961) first 
demonstrates that price dispersion can persist in a competitive market if the acquisition of in-
formation is costly. Consumers acquire information on a limited number of sellers and choose 
among them. As a result, even firms that sell their products for a non-marginal price face a 
positive demand. In this setting, the cost of acquiring information has a positive impact on 
price dispersion by reducing the sample of suppliers that consumers analyze in order to make 
their purchase decision.  
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In this paper, we model fund fees as a function of variables that are commonly used to ex-
plain the price of investment services. We therefore try to control for possible sources of he-
terogeneity. Admittedly, this approach has some limitations. All of our proxies for hetero-
geneity are ex-post variables. For example, we use past performance to proxy for the ability 
of the fund manager (a likely source of heterogeneity among funds). However, fund fees 
should reflect investors' expectations with regard to future performance, which clearly cannot 
be observed. If an investor believes that a fund manager is particularly good, irrespective of 
the manager’s past performance, he or she will be willing to pay a higher fee. However, the 
extent of the limitations of using ex-post variables depends on how well these variables ex-
plain unobservable heterogeneity. Turning back to the example of the fund manager’s ability, 
it is reasonable to assume that investors learn about managerial ability by observing the past 
performance of the fund (Berk and Green, 2004; Huang et al., 2007).  
We find that around 40% of fee dispersion can be explained using observable sources of hete-
rogeneity, such as past performance and other characteristics of the fund and of the invest-
ment company in question. By controlling for such observable sources of heterogeneity, we 
find that fee dispersion decreases with fund size and age, as well as with the amount of assets 
under management of the investment company. In addition, we find that the degree of resi-
dual fee dispersion is lower for funds that charge marketing and distribution fees. Our results 
are consistent with the theoretical prediction that search costs positively affect fee dispersion. 
However, we cannot rule out the alternative hypothesis that our results are driven by some 
unobserved source of heterogeneity. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we present our empirical metho-
dology. The dataset is described in Section 3. In Section 4, we analyze the relationship be-
tween the pricing policy at the fund family level and fee dispersion. We discuss our empirical 
results in Section 5 and draw conclusions in Section 6. 
 5
2. Methodology 
We employ the following heteroscedastic regression model, as proposed by Harvey (1976): 
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where yit is a random variable (the dependent variable) with mean it and variance 2it , and 
xit and zit are (vectors of) covariates predicting the mean and log variance of y, respectively. 
Thus, we have a linear model for the expected value (mean) and a log-linear model for the 
variance of a response variable, which are conditional on a set of covariates that predict the 
mean and variance. The coefficients  and  are to be estimated. In addition, the residuals eit 
are usually assumed to be standard, normally distributed and independent. As we have a pan-
el dataset with multiple observations for every fund, we consider clustered residuals in order 
to increase the robustness of our estimates.  
2.1. The mean equation 
Our dependent variable is the expense ratio net of 12b-1 fees for every fund/year in our sam-
ple.1 The reader should note that for a significant number of funds in our database, the fiscal 
year is different from the calendar year, with the end of October being the most common non-
conventional fiscal year closing date. This may affect our results because in the panel we 
consider as contemporary expense ratios that are actually measured on different horizons. In 
order to resolve this problem, we recalculate the expense ratios on a calendar year basis. If a 
fund closes the fiscal year for year t at the end of October, the expense ratio for calendar year 
t in our database is now a weighted average of the expense ratio of fiscal year t and that 
                                                 
1 We also run our model separately on the two main components of expense ratios, management fees and other 
administrative expenses, and obtain very similar results.  
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which was reported for fiscal year t+1. The weight of the latter is 2/12, which represents the 
number of months of calendar year t which are accounted for in fiscal year t+1. Admittedly, 
this procedure can only yield an estimate of the expense ratio paid by the investor in calendar 
year t; however, as the expense ratios in our sample tend to be stable, it can be considered a 
reasonable proxy. Indeed, the correlation coefficient between the expense ratios reported for 
the fiscal years and our estimated expense ratios for calendar years is above 0.99. Moreover, 
calendar year approximation for expense ratios is common practice in the relevant literature 
(see, for example, Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú, 2009; Huang et al., 2007). 
Equation (2), henceforth the “mean equation”, models the expected value of the expense ratio 
as a linear function of a certain number of explanatory variables which should reflect the de-
gree of observable heterogeneity among funds. We can separate our covariates into four 
broad categories. 
1. Past performance. If we assume that performance is not due to pure chance, a better-
quality management will probably ask for a higher compensation. Moreover, many re-
searchers have documented a positive and asymmetric relationship between mutual fund 
flows and past performance.2 From a standard market perspective, products that are in 
high demand should cost more than products for which the demand is low. We model past 
performance with three different variables: (i) RET, the 36-month return (gross expense 
ratio) of the fund from year t-3 to year t-1; (ii) ALPHA, the 36-month four-factor alpha es-
timated with the standard Fama, French and Carhart factors on monthly returns from t-3 
to t-1; and (iii) RANK, the fund’s return ranking in relation to other funds with the same 
investment objective in the year t-1. The significance of all of these variables is proven in 
the existing flow-performance literature. We measure them on different time horizons in 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Ippolito (1992), Gruber (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998) and 
Huang et al. (2007). 
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order to capture different aspects of past performance. RANK is measured over the past 
year, because Sirri and Tufano (1998) show that this time frame has a higher explanatory 
power than a three-year period.3 We use ALPHA and RET in different specifications of 
our model; as they are intended to capture the concept of managerial ability, three years is 
a reasonable midpoint in the tradeoff between the stability of the alpha estimate and the 
relevance to investors. We also test different specifications using up to 60 months of past 
returns without any material change in the results of the analysis. The results which are 
documented in the literature on the relationship between past performance and fees are 
mixed, and so we do not have a strong prior with regard to this variable; 
2. Cost structure of the investment company. Baumol et al. (1990) and Latzko (1999) dem-
onstrate that mutual fund management shows the presence of significant economies of 
scale. The average cost decreases with the fund’s assets; nonetheless, the rate of reduction 
drops heavily at about $3.5 billion (Latzko 1999). In a competitive market, investment 
companies may pass these savings on to investors through a reduction in the expense ra-
tios, thereby trading a higher unit profit margin for higher volumes of assets under man-
agement. In order to capture this phenomenon, we use ICSIZE, the natural logarithm of 
the size of the fund complex, and SIZE, the natural logarithm of the fund size. Both va-
riables are defined at the end of year t-1. In accordance with the competition hypothesis, 
we should expect a negative relationship between both measures of size and the expense 
ratio. 
Khorana et al. (2009) show a negative relationship between expense ratios and the age of 
the fund due to experience economies that result in lower management costs. These sav-
ings are, at least in part, passed on to investors. We capture this effect with a dummy va-
                                                 
3 Investors seem to consider a fund’s recent past performance to be more salient than older returns in their deci-
sion-making.  
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riable (AGE) which is set equal to 1 if at least 5 years have passed since the fund was first 
offered to the public. 
3. Heterogeneous clientele. Many contributions to the literature show that mutual funds may 
cater to specific clientele defined by different levels of financial sophistication or differ-
ent preferences. Funds may offer a different bundle of services to these clients and charge 
a different price. Hogue and Wellman (2007) argue that mutual funds use loads to diffe-
rentiate customers with lower levels of financial sophistication and charge higher expense 
ratios. This idea is partially confirmed by a survey conducted by the Investment Company 
Institute in 2008 on the profile of mutual fund shareholders. This survey reveals that in-
vestors who buy mutual funds through a direct channel have a (slightly) higher level of 
education and income than investors who use the services of some sort of sales force. In 
addition, Capon et al. (1996) cluster investors according to the sources of information 
they use in their investment decision-making process; they document the presence of a 
group of “commission-based advisees” defined by the “the disproportionately high impor-
tance of commission-based financial advisors as an information source.” On a related 
note, Bergstresser et al. (2009) find that loads/brokered funds deliver lower risk-adjusted 
returns (net of the expense ratio), even before subtracting the distribution costs, and dis-
play no better skills with regard to asset allocation. The authors conclude that this evi-
dence is consistent with the fact that load funds deliver other intangible benefits or with 
the existence of a significant conflict of interests. Christoffersen et al. (2005) show that 
mutual fund flows in load funds are less prone to the disposition effect and consider this 
to be a valuable service provided by brokers to mutual fund investors who choose to in-
vest in load funds.  
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We try to capture this clientele effect using a dummy variable (FR_LOADS), set equal to 
one if the fund charges front-end loads,4 and two variables (BACK_LOADS and 
LEV_LOADS) that capture the effect of deferred loads. We use two different variables be-
cause it is well known that both back-end and level-load funds can charge deferred loads. 
In the latter case, the broker is compensated through a yearly charge, the 12b-1 fees, if the 
investor stays invested for more than one year, and otherwise a load is applied at the mo-
ment of the early redemption. In addition, our database (CRSP Mutual Funds) does not 
uniquely identify the type of share class, and we have to infer the type of distribution ar-
rangement from the fee structure. Livingston and O’Neal (1998), O’Neal (1999) and 
Nanda et al. (2009) report the typical fee arrangements for different share classes, and it 
appears that level-load funds are characterized by lower deferred loads (typically 1%) and 
higher 12b-1 fees (again 1%) than back-end funds, which in turn report much higher 
loads (5% as a maximum level that typically decreases by 100 bp for each year of perma-
nence in the fund) and marginally lower 12b-1 fees. We thus define a dummy variable for 
level-load funds (LEV_LOADS) when the deferred load is no higher than 1% and the 12b-
1 fee is no lower than 1%. We also define a dummy variable for back-end load funds 
(BACK_LOADS) for when the funds charges a deferred load and the conditions men-
tioned above are not satisfied.5 Based on the existing literature, we expect a positive rela-
tionship between loads and expense ratios. 
In 1980, the Securities and Exchange Commission approved rule 12b-1, which authorizes 
mutual funds to deduct a sum of money from the net assets in order to remunerate bro-
                                                 
4 In different specifications, we also used the actual value of the loads instead of dummy variables. All of the 
specifications led to the same conclusions. 
5 In order to test the robustness of our results with regard to the definition of the two dummy variables relating 
to deferred loads, we also tried different specifications, lowering the minimum 12-b1 fee requirement for level 
funds (to 0.5% and 0.25%) and dropping it altogether, thereby distinguishing between the two types solely on 
the basis of the size of the maximum deferred load. All of our results are robust to these different specifications. 
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kers. Both Ferris and Chance (1987) and Dukes et al. (2006) document a positive rela-
tionship between 12b-1 fees and the expense ratio (net of the distribution costs). As it is 
reasonable to assume that, to a certain extent, these fees can act as substitutes for loads, 
we include an additional variable (12b-1), which is defined as the actual distribution fees 
charged by the fund. 
Christoffersen and Musto (2002) argue that mutual funds that cater to less performance-
sensitive investors can charge higher fees. In order to capture this sensitivity of the clien-
tele, we replicate their Q/MAX measure as the ratio of the assets under management at 
the end of the year t-1 to the maximum value of the assets under management during the 
same year. The rationale behind this measure is that performance-sensitive investors are 
the first to leave the fund after a bad performance, and so the lower the measure, the 
higher the proportion of performance-sensitive investors that have left the fund in the last 
year and the lower the average performance sensitivity of the actual investors. The au-
thors show, for money market funds, a negative relationship between this measure and the 
fee level; 
4. Portfolio structure. The main service offered by investment companies is their participa-
tion in the return of the mutual fund portfolio; we should therefore expect different prices 
for different portfolios. Of course, part of this effect should be captured by the perfor-
mance measure, but we can assume that, under certain market conditions, investors may 
demand certain types of stock (for example, small caps or growth stocks), regardless of 
their past performance. In our sample, we consider US domestic equity funds without in-
dustry specificities. In order to capture different portfolio effects, we use: 
a. The betas of a standard Fama, French and Carhart four-factor model estimated 
over the course of the 36 months from t-3 to t-1 (MKT, SMB, HML, UMD); 
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b. The standard deviation of fund returns (DEV), the R2 of a four-factor model 
(RSQ), both calculated over the course of the 36 months from t-3 to t-1, and 
the turnover of the fund in the year t-1 (TRN); 
c. A set of six dummy variables designed using Standard & Poor’s objective 
codes in the CRSP database for aggressive growth, growth, growth and in-
come, income and growth, midcaps and small caps. 
We do not have a strong prior for the variable in sub-point (a), and consider these betas 
to be controls. With regard to the variables in (c), we could argue that some stocks, such 
as small cap or growth stocks, are more difficult to analyze and more expensive to trade. 
As far as the variables in (b) are concerned, we argue that high-volatility funds or funds 
that operate in a highly volatile context are more difficult to manage and should charge 
higher fees,6 while funds with a high R2 are de facto index funds and should charge lower 
fees (they require fewer managerial skills and a more passive management style). Final-
ly, funds with a higher turnover should, for obvious reasons, charge a higher expense ra-
tio.  
We also use time dummy variables to control for variation over time in the level of market 
competition and investment-objective dummy variables to control for heterogeneity among 
different categories of mutual funds. 
2.2. The variance equation 
The mean equation is intended to control for observable heterogeneity. In Equation (3), hen-
ceforth the “variance equation,” the dependent variable is the log of the squared residual of 
the mean regression. We model the residual dispersion as a function of variables that should 
                                                 
6 Moreover, investors in these funds should be less sensitive to fees as they are easily disguised by the highly 
volatile returns. 
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capture the level of search costs. As previously mentioned, we cannot rule out the possibility 
that such variables reflect some unobserved heterogeneity. Following the work of Huang et 
al. (2007), we consider three different aspects: 
1. Fund visibility. Search costs are inversely related to the visibility of the fund, as it is easi-
er and cheaper to acquire information on well-known and established funds. We therefore 
include the (natural logarithms of the) fund size (SIZE), the size of the investment com-
plex (ICSIZE) and the age of the fund (AGE). We assume that larger (and older) funds 
and larger fund families would receive more media coverage and that investors would 
easily be able to acquire a significant amount of information on them. Moreover, a large 
number of investors already have information about these funds because they own, or 
have previously owned, funds managed by the same family (see Capon et al., 1996). This 
is particularly important as many investors seem to rely on word of mouth as a source of 
information. Alexander at al. (1998) show that, out of a sample of 2000 mutual fund in-
vestors, 37% use “family or friends” as a source of information (this was the second most 
popular source of information after fund prospectuses) and that 16.3% of the sample con-
sidered family or friends to be the best source of information. As all of these variables re-
duce information costs, they should be negatively related to fee dispersion; 
2. Fund sales effort. Mutual funds can increase their own visibility by investing in incen-
tives to encourage brokers and advisers to create and distribute information on the fund to 
the public. We cannot observe this effort directly; however, following the intuition of Sir-
ri and Tufano (1998), we use the front loads (FR_LOADS) and the 12b-1 fees (12b-1) as 
proxies. The existing literature shows that brokers play an active role in producing infor-
mation and helping investors with their investment decision-making process on the basis 
of this information. Alexander at al. (1998) report that 31% of the investors in their sam-
ple used the broker as a source of information and that 16.9% of the sample considered 
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the broker to be the best source of information, while Zhao (2005) demonstrates that bro-
kers play a significant role in the decision-making of investors who buy shares in load 
funds. Our variables should measure the support that the fund receives from the sales 
channel in terms of information production and should be negatively related to fee disper-
sion; 
3. Switching costs. Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004) argue that fee dispersion may be generat-
ed by a “switching-cost-induced parking behavior.” According to this hypothesis, inves-
tors are less sensitive to fees if they invest in funds with a significant switching cost. For 
these funds, we should therefore expect a greater degree of fee dispersion. We model 
switching cost using two dummy variables for back-end load (BACK_LOADS) and level-
load (LEV_LOADS) funds. These are the share classes that may charge deferred loads. 
Search costs in the mutual fund market can change over time. For example, new channels of 
information (e.g., the Internet) and the increasing level of investors’ financial education 
might have reduced search costs over time. As such, we include time fixed effects in the va-
riance equation. In addition, search costs may differ between funds with different investment 
objectives. For example, more aggressive strategies might attract sophisticated investors with 
lower search costs. Similarly, the degree of competition between funds might change from 
one investment objective to another, thus affecting the level of transparency required by the 
market. We therefore include investment objective dummy variables as controls. 
As noted above, one may argue that some of the variables used in the variance equation could 
reflect fund heterogeneity. For example, younger or smaller funds could manage less homo-
genous portfolios compared to larger and more established funds. In this case, an increase in 
fee dispersion would not originate from increased search costs. We attempt to minimize this 
potential problem by including in some of the specifications of the variance equation two ad-
ditional variables: ALPHA2, the squared value of the four-factor alpha, and DIST, a measure 
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of the distance of the portfolio from the average equity portfolio. The starting point for this 
variable is the OLS estimation of a standard Fama, French and Carhart 4-factor model:7 
 
        )4(itdtutumdilththmlibtstsmbitmtmktiitit rrrrrrrfrrfr  
 
Where: 
- rit is the monthly return of the mutual fund; 
- rft is the one-month treasury bill rate; 
- rmt is the return of the US CRSP total market index (including NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ); 
- rst and rbt are the monthly returns of a small-cap and a large-cap portfolio (following 
Fama and French’s (1993) definition, the size breakpoint for year t is the median 
NYSE market equity at the end of June in year t); 
- rht and rlt are the monthly returns of portfolios of stocks with high and low price-book 
value respectively (once again, following Fama and French’s (1993) definition, the 
price-book value breakpoints are the 30th and 70th NYSE percentiles); 
- rut and rdt are the monthly returns of portfolios of stocks with high and low prior re-
turns (from month t-2 to t-12) respectively (the prior performance breakpoints are the 
30th and 70th NYSE percentiles). 
From the definition of the variables, it follows that running this model on a mutual fund that 
replicates the market index would produce a market beta equal to one and betas for the last 
three factors equal to zero. We can thus build a variable in order to measure the distance be-
tween a given fund and this “standard index fund” (that replicates the market portfolio) as the 
                                                 
7 For a complete definition of these variables, see Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). 
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sum of the squared values of the differences between the betas and their respective expected 
values, specifically:  
        )5(0001 2222  umdihmlismbimktiiDIST 
 
We do not mean to cast these two additional variables (ALPHA2 and DIST) as definitive con-
trols with regard to the problem of unobserved heterogeneity. Nevertheless, the robustness of 
our results following the inclusion of these controls is reassuring.  
3. Dataset 
We use data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Survivorship Bias Free 
Mutual Fund Database, from which we obtain information about the net asset values, returns 
and characteristics of our funds. We collect data for the period from 1993 to 2006 on all non-
industry-specific US domestic equity funds with assets under management which are no 
smaller than USD 10 million. As in our model we will use results from the estimation of a 
Fama-French-Carhart 4-factor model, we only consider funds with  past data covering at least 
36 months. The number of funds in our sample grows from 562 in 1993 to 3448 in 2006.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for our entire sample. The percentage of no-load funds8 is 
decreasing during our sample period, from around 44% to 33%. The average expense ratio 
grows from 1.21% in 1993 to 1.42% in 2003, and then decreases to 1.34% in 2006. In order 
                                                 
8 These are defined as funds that do not charge front or deferred loads and do not charge 12b-1 fees above 25 
bps. 
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to avoid possible errors, we dropped all the observations with non-positive expense ratios or 
expense ratios lower than the 12b-1 actually charged. The expense ratio net of these fees re-
mains stable at around 1% (meaning that the volatility in the average expense ratio is mainly 
due to the 12b-1 fees). The cross-sectional volatility is, on average, 0.39, with a range of 
about 90 basis points between the 10th and the 90th percentiles. 
We group the funds according to homogeneous categories using Standard & PoorS&P’s in-
vestment objectives, provided by CRSP. Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the six dif-
ferent investment objectives which were considered.  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
The average value of the expense ratio (net of the 12b-1 fees) varies across the different cate-
gories, with aggressive growth and small-cap funds predictably at the top of the ranking. 
These funds invest in the group of stocks with the highest cross-sectional volatility, and so it 
is reasonable to expect a higher cost for the management service. It is interesting to note that 
the same pattern does not apply for fee dispersion: by looking at the coefficients of variation, 
we can see that growth and income funds have the greatest dispersion, and that both growth 
and income and growth have higher levels of dispersion than small-cap funds. 
Table 3 reports the correlation coefficients between the variables included in the variance eq-
uation as well as the p-values of the test against the null hypothesis of a lack of correlation. 
Most of the coefficients are statistically different from zero, but the values are sufficiently 
low to reasonably rule out any problems of multicollinearity. In order to perform a more for-
mal test of multicollinearity, we ran a two-stage estimation of our heteroscedastic model and 
calculated variance inflation factors (VIFs) for both the mean and the variance equation. The 
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two-stage estimation is less efficient; however, as it performs two separate OLS estimations 
for the mean and the variance equations (instead of a single ML estimation), it allows us to 
perform separate tests for multicollinearity. All the VIFs are below 4, which is much lower 
than the usual critical level of 10 (see Hair et al., 2005). This rules out any concerns regarding 
multicollinearity. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
4. Fund families and pricing policies 
Before moving to our multivariate test, we have to address an important issue related to the 
pricing policies of mutual fund families. It is common for investment companies to manage 
more than one fund within the same fund category, and in doing so the company may follow 
slightly different investment policies or cater to a different clientele. The relevant question 
then becomes whether the correct level of analysis for a study on fee dispersion is the mutual 
fund (share class) or the fund family/investment objective group. If a fund family chooses a 
common price for all of the funds with a given investment objective, we would end up relat-
ing mutual fund fees to fund characteristics (such as size and age), whereas actually we 
should consider explanatory variables relating to the fund family. The question is not whether 
there is a coordinated pricing policy within mutual fund families, but to what extent the pric-
ing of a given mutual fund share is based on its own characteristics as opposed to family-
related issues. If the weight of the latter is predominant, a fund-level analysis of fee disper-
sion would be fatally mis-specified. 
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We empirically address this problem in three ways. First of all, we run an ANOVA in order 
to determine the proportion of fee dispersion that can be explained at the fund level compared 
to the proportion that is determined by the family and investment objective of the fund.  
Table 4 reports the sequential sum of squared errors generated considering the variability in 
expense ratios (net of 12b-1 fees) across different years, investment objectives and fund fami-
lies. About 40.6% of fee dispersion can be explained simply by the fact that a fund belongs to 
a certain family and a certain strategy, whereas 46% of price dispersion is at the individual 
fund level. This analysis clearly confirms the existence of a family-level pricing strategy, but 
as a significant portion of price dispersion is explained by fund-level information, this also 
validates our fund-level approach. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
We also perform a less formal test by comparing the fee dispersion for funds with the same 
investment objective managed by the same investment company with the fee dispersion for 
all of the funds in the category in question. We restrict our analysis to family/strategy groups 
with at least five funds. The results in Table 5 show that only half of the family/strategy 
groups show a fee dispersion which is significantly lower (at the 5% level) than the strategy-
wide dispersion, and that these low-dispersion groups account for around 53% of the funds in 
our sample. This percentage varies across investment objectives, ranging from around 43% 
for growth and income funds to 72% for aggressive growth funds. The table also shows that 
the average dispersion inside the “low-dispersion” group is around 63% (57% if weighted for 
the number of funds) lower than the corresponding strategy-wide fee dispersion. 
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[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
This analysis confirms that a significant amount of fee dispersion is generated at the individ-
ual fund level because half of the family-strategy groups revealed a dispersion level which 
was not significantly lower than the population-level one.  
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Heterogeneity and fee dispersion 
The results of the mean equation in Table 69 show that our explanatory variables explain 
around 40% of the variability of the expense ratio net of the 12b-1 fees. The signs of the coef-
ficients confirm most of our predictions. The negative coefficients of SIZE and ICSIZE show 
that at least part of the reduction in costs which comes from economies of scale is passed 
along to investors. The result regarding experience economies is counterintuitive, with older 
funds charging, on average, higher expense ratios. We find evidence of significant clientele 
effects. We see that investors who avail themselves of brokerage services are charged higher 
expense ratios10 (positive coefficients for FR_LOADS, BACK_LOADS, LEV_LOADS and 
12b-1), while investors who are less sensitive to performance are charged higher expense ra-
tios (negative Q/MAX coefficient).  
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
                                                 
9 The results of the variance equation are reported in Table 8 and discussed later in the paper. 
10 This result is compatible with both the hypothesis of a straightforward rip-off of less sophisticated investors 
(Zhao, 2005) and the hypothesis that some additional benefits are delivered by brokers to these investors 
(Bergstresser et al., 2009).  
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We document significant effects of the portfolio structure on the expense ratio: predictably, 
funds with a low four-factor R2 and funds with a high turnover charge more, as a result of 
more active management. In addition, funds with a higher degree of risk and funds that invest 
heavily in small caps charge more. This result may show a reverse causality problem. Fami-
lies that charge lower expense ratios are more likely to have funds at the top of their category 
rankings. We also find a non-significant relationship between total return performance meas-
ures (past gross return and performance rank) and fees and a positive relationship between the 
four-factor alpha and the expense ratio, thus suggesting that investors are willing to remune-
rate managerial ability more than total return. The model has the same explanatory power re-
gardless of the performance variable used. For the rest of our analysis, we will consider AL-
PHA, the variable with the most interesting and meaningful result. All of these results are ro-
bust to the inclusion of year and investment objective fixed effects. 
5.2. Search costs and fee dispersion 
Assuming that the variables used in the mean equation are perfect controls for heterogeneity, 
the unexplained dispersion should reflect search costs.11 
First, we test the heteroscedasticity of our mean equation, as heteroscedasticity would suggest 
that the dispersion of residual fees is not constant throughout the mutual fund population. We 
run both the standard Breusch and Pagan (1979) and the Koenker (1981) tests of heterosce-
dasticity on an OLS estimation of our mean equation. The first test assumes the normality of 
the residuals, while the second only assumes the residuals to be i.i.d. The two tests are run for 
the sample as a whole and also year-by-year. The results confirm the presence of heterosce-
                                                 
11 As we pointed out earlier in the paper, unobserved heterogeneity remains as an alternative hypothesis. 
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dasticity in each one of the years in our sample,12 thus demonstrating that fee dispersion va-
ries across the mutual fund population. 
We then test whether or not search costs affect fee dispersion. An intuitive way to measure 
the relationship between fee dispersion and our search cost proxies is to look at the variance 
of (the unexplained portion of) expense ratios among the different groups of funds. Using our 
five proxy variables for search costs, we define high- and low-search cost mutual fund 
groups. For fund size (SIZE) and investment company size (ICSIZE), we define as having 
high search costs (low search costs) those funds in the lowest (highest) quartile. With regard 
to the AGE dummy variable, we define as having high search costs (low search costs) the 
funds with less than (more than or equal to) five years of past performance. For front-end 
loads and 12b-1 fees, we define as having high search costs (low search costs) the funds that 
do not (do) charge this kind of fee. We compute the variance of the residuals from model C.3 
in Table 6 for the two groups and perform a standard F-test on the ratio between the two va-
riances.  
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
The results of the F-tests in Table 7 show that for every proxy variable, the ratio between the 
standard deviations of the high- and low-search cost groups is always significantly greater 
than one, confirming that expense ratios are more dispersed among high-search cost funds. 
The differences are not only statistically but also economically significant. If we consider that 
the average expense ratio for our entire sample is around 1%, we can sense the relevance of 
                                                 
12 Numerical results are available from the authors upon request. 
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the difference between the standard deviation of the expense ratio for the group of the largest 
funds (0.22%) and that of the group of the smallest funds (0.30%). 
Moving on to our multivariate test, we now look at the variance equation of the model de-
scribed in Section 2 (see Table 8). We consider two possible specifications of the mean equa-
tion. In models A.1–A.4 and C.4–E.4, we use the linear specification of model C.3 in Table 6, 
while in model B.4 we use a piecewise specification in which every continuous variable of 
the mean equation is broken into deciles. This second specification allows us to test whether 
the results of the variance equation are influenced by a non-linear relationship between the 
fee and the explanatory variables in the mean equation. In all of the models, we control for 
the year and investment objective effects.  
Mutual fund fees are likely to be influenced by market-wide shocks across funds. It is thus 
reasonable to assume that funds are not (statistically) independent observations at a given 
point in time. The resulting residual cross-correlations across funds could be substantial, and 
thus an OLS estimation of our model would yield downward-biased standard errors. In order 
to address this problem, we perform three different robustness checks: 
- In model C.4, we run our basic experiment by using a two-stage version of the Harvey 
(1976) model and clustering the residuals at both the year level and at the fund level, as 
opposed to the previous models in which only the latter dimension was considered. Both 
Petersen (2009) and Thompson (2011) show that this methodology leads to significantly 
more accurate inferences in panel estimations; 
- In model D.4, for each year, we estimate a cross-sectional mean regression in order to ob-
tain regression residuals. We then use the natural logarithm of the squared value of these 
residuals as the dependent variable in a series of cross-sectional variance regression esti-
mations (again, one for each year). Finally, we use the time series of the estimated coeffi-
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cients to conduct a t-test of their significance. This procedure yields a Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) estimation of our model, in which the mean and variance equations for each year 
are estimated separately (the two-stage version of the Harvey (1976) model). Petersen 
(2009) shows that Fama and MacBeth deal correctly with the bias induced in the standard 
errors by the correlation among individuals (funds) at a given point in time; 
- In model E.4, we run the standard Harvey (1976) model separately for each year (as in the 
Fama-MacBeth approach). We then compute the mean of the time-series of the coeffi-
cients and test their significance. Unlike the previous approach, we now keep the simulta-
neous estimation of the mean and variance equations within a specific year. 
The fact that the results are stable across specifications A.4–E.4 indicates that common, unob-
served time-related factors do not play a significant role. 
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
Looking at Table 8, we can note that most of the variables show stable coefficients with the 
expected sign. Funds with a higher degree of visibility (larger and older funds and funds ma-
naged by larger investment companies) and funds with a higher degree of sales effort (non-
zero front loads and high 12b-1 fees) show lower levels of residual fee dispersion.13 In mod-
els A.4–E.4, we include ALPHA2 and DIST, with no material change in the results. 
In order to measure the practical relevance of these effects, we use the coefficients of the re-
gression to estimate the expected fee (from the mean equation) and the mean absolute resi-
                                                 
13 We also find that funds with high switching costs (back-end load funds) have a higher level of price disper-
sion. The coefficient for level-load funds is always positive but not significant. This is reasonable if we consider 
that for these funds, the switching cost disappears after just 12 months of permanence. 
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dual fee (from the variance equation) for high- and low-search cost funds.14 Table 9 reports 
the ratio between the unexpected and the expected fee for the two groups and the percentage 
increase in the ratio if a fund moves from the low- to the high-search cost group. 
If we look at the change in the ratio of unexpected to expected fees, we can observe that for 
all of our proxy variables (except investment company size), moving from the low- to the 
high-search cost group would generate an increase in the relevance of the unexplained fee. 
The size of this increase ranges from 10% for the fund visibility proxies (size and age) to 
more than 20% for the sales effort variables (12b-1 fees and front loads). 
 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
Overall, our results seem to suggest that a positive and significant relationship exists between 
search costs and price dispersion for equity mutual funds. One alternative explanation for 
these empirical findings is that our search cost variables are also proxies for unobserved hete-
rogeneity. We therefore run a number of additional tests.  
We run regressions including the fund R2 (both as a substitution for and in addition to AL-
PHA2 and DIST) as a (inverse) measure of fund heterogeneity with no change in the main re-
sults. In addition, we run our model on a subsample of funds with low heterogeneity (R2 
                                                 
14 We consider the fifth percentile value for SIZE, ICSIZE and 12b-1, a value of zero for the dummy variables 
AGE and FR_LOADS and a value of one for BACK_LOADS and LEV_LOADS (the fund has switching costs) to 
indicate high search costs. We consider the 95th percentile for the continuous variables, a value of one for the 
dummy variables AGE and FR_LOADS and a value of one for BACK_LOADS and LEV_LOADS to indicate low 
search costs. In order to capture the marginal effect of each variable, we consider changes in each proxy variable 
separately. For all of the other variables, we consider the median value and the results are averaged across years 
and fund complex/investment objective groups.  
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higher than 0.92, the median value in our sample) and again, all of our main results are con-
firmed.15  
We explore the search cost interpretation, by looking at the asymmetry of the residual fee 
dispersion. A decrease in search costs should reduce both uncommonly high and uncommon-
ly low expense ratios. 
 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
We estimate our mean equation on a year-by-year basis in a quantile regression framework 
and use the residuals to build a discrete response variable that can assume three different val-
ues: “high” if the observation is in the top decile; “low” if it is in the bottom decile and “mid” 
if it is neither. We then measure the effect of our search cost proxies on the probability of a 
fund to charge particularly high or low fees. We run multinomial logit regressions using 
“mid” as the base case. Table 10 reports the coefficients of the two parts of the model and 
tests the significance of the difference between them. We can see that the effects of all of our 
proxies for search costs (with the exception of ICSIZE) are symmetrical in sign. They all re-
duce the probability that a fund will charge very high or very low fees.  
Notwithstanding these robustness checks and additional tests, we cannot rule out the possibil-
ity that unobserved heterogeneity is partially responsible for our results. 
                                                 
15 Numerical results are available from the authors upon request. 
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6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we analyze the determinants of the cross section of mutual fund fee dispersion. 
Price dispersion for homogenous products is considered in the literature as an indirect meas-
ure of market inefficiency with a direct effect on consumer welfare. When prices are dis-
persed, there are sellers who charge a non-marginal price, thereby reducing the amount of 
surplus for consumers. Actively managed mutual funds cannot be considered to be homoge-
neous products. Indeed, a primary source of fee dispersion is heterogeneity of products, clien-
teles and production functions. We find that around 40% of fee dispersion can be explained 
by observable sources of heterogeneity, such as past performance and other characteristics of 
the fund and of the investment company in question. 
However, the relevant theory predicts that search costs also can generate fee dispersion. By 
controlling for observable sources of heterogeneity, we find that fee dispersion decreases 
with fund size and age, as well as with the amount of assets under management of the in-
vestment company. In addition, we find that the level of fee dispersion is lower for funds that 
charge marketing and distribution fees. The effect of these proxy variables for search costs is 
economically meaningful and symmetrical. Although we cannot rule out the possibility that 
the search cost proxies used in this paper may also reflect some unobserved source of hetero-
geneity, our results are consistent with the theoretical prediction that search costs positively 
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This table reports the summary statistics of our sample from 1993 to 2006. At the end of each year, we calculate 
the cross-sectional mean value of the total net asset value, the age of the fund, the average number of no-load 
funds, the expense ratio and the expense ratio net of the 12b-1 fees charged during the year. For this last varia-
ble, we also provide cross-sectional standard deviations, coefficients of variation and the 10th and 90th percen-
tiles. 
 
      Expense ratio (net of 12b-1 fees) 
















1993 562 612.22 18.28 43.95 1.21 1.03 0.34 0.33 0.65 1.43 
1994 609 753.35 18.96 45.48 1.18 1.01 0.35 0.34 0.64 1.38 
1995 681 732.60 18.16 48.90 1.19 1.02 0.34 0.33 0.66 1.40 
1996 863 897.53 15.77 52.03 1.19 1.01 0.39 0.38 0.63 1.39 
1997 1110 966.09 13.86 48.56 1.21 0.98 0.34 0.35 0.61 1.37 
1998 1358 1010.70 12.90 46.02 1.25 0.98 0.32 0.32 0.63 1.37 
1999 1616 1071.43 12.38 44.68 1.30 0.99 0.32 0.32 0.63 1.37 
2000 1996 1128.11 11.64 44.69 1.30 0.98 0.34 0.35 0.61 1.38 
2001 2352 1039.09 11.20 43.15 1.32 0.99 0.35 0.35 0.57 1.40 
2002 2649 818.36 11.16 42.32 1.37 1.02 0.35 0.34 0.60 1.43 
2003 3016 558.65 10.60 38.93 1.42 1.05 0.37 0.35 0.6 1.49 
2004 3191 728.90 10.81 37.86 1.41 1.05 0.38 0.36 0.59 1.46 
2005 3437 791.57 10.98 35.03 1.36 1.01 0.36 0.36 0.55 1.41 
2006 3448 688.51 11.13 32.57 1.34 0.98 0.36 0.37 0.55 1.38 






Summary statistics for investment objectives 
This table reports the summary statistics for the six Standard & Poor’s investment objectives included in our 
sample. For every group of funds, we calculate the cross-sectional mean value of the number of funds in the cat-
egory, the total net asset value and the expense ratio net of the 12b-1 fees charged during the year. For this last 
variable, we also provide cross-sectional standard deviations, coefficients of variation and the 10th and 90th per-
centiles. 
 
      Expense ratio (net of 12b-1 Fees) 
  Average number 












Aggressive growth 122 670.50 1.24 0.45 0.36 0.80 1.75 
Growth 199 495.43 1.04 0.29 0.28 0.70 1.40 
Growth and income 456 1223.09 0.83 0.35 0.42 0.35 1.24 
Income and growth 654 899.84 1.01 0.32 0.32 0.66 1.38 
Midcaps 98 1184.49 0.90 0.26 0.29 0.64 1.21 
Small cap 394 377.46 1.15 0.33 0.28 0.80 1.50 





Correlations between the independent variables in the variance equation 
This table reports the correlation coefficients between the right-hand side variables in the variance equation of 
our heteroscedastic regression model (the p-values of tests against the null hypothesis of zero correlation are 
given in parentheses). 
 
  




SIZE 1                 
                  
ICSIZE 0.3590 1               
(0.000)                 
AGE 0.1836 0.0047 1             
(0.000) (0.437)               
FR_LOADS 0.0412 0.0686 0.0481 1           
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)             
12B-1 -0.2070 0.1760 -0.0714 -0.0575 1         
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)           
LEV_LOADS -0.1423 0.0875 -0.0567 -0.0377 0.4779 1       
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)         
BACK_LOADS -0.0746 0.1514 0.0179 0.0558 0.4342 -0.1981 1     
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
ALPHA2 -0.0130 -0.0521 -0.0456 -0.0125 0.0007 0.0086 -0.0053 1   
(0.033) (0.000) (0.000) (0.041) (0.904) (0.161) (0.382)     
DIST 
-0.0056 -0.0181 -0.0065 -0.0121 -0.0088 -0.0032 -0.0085 0.0355 1 
(0.359) (0.003) (0.284) (0.047) (0.148) (0.600) (0.163) (0.000)   
 32
Table 4 
Fee dispersion at the fund family level and at the individual fund level 
This table reports the results of a univariate ANOVA in which the dependent variable is the expense ratio net of 
the 12b-1fees. On the right-hand side we consider dummy variables for year (Year), fund investment objective 
(Strategy), the interaction between the two (Year*strategy), fund family (Family) and the interaction between 
fund family and strategy (Family*strategy). The last column reports the percentage of fee dispersion explained 
by a given variable measured as the ratio of the sum of the squared errors. 
 
Source 








F P-value % of  dispersion 
Model 3907.498 1855 2.106 28.85 0.000 54.0 
       
Year 34.299 15 2.287 31.32 0.000 0.5 
Strategy 909.184 5 181.837 2490.63 0.000 12.6 
Year*strategy 25.410 73 0.348 4.77 0.000 0.4 
Family 2354.518 631 3.731 51.11 0.000 32.5 
Family*strategy 584.086 1131 0.516 7.07 0.000 8.1 
       
Residual 3331.959 45638 0.073   46.0 







Summary statistics for investment objectives 
This table reports the results of a test of the dispersion of expense ratios (net of 12-b1 fees) within fund families 
with more than five funds with the same investment objective. The second column reports the percentage of 
family/strategy groups with a dispersion level which is significantly lower (at the 5% level) than the dispersion 
level of all of the funds in the same category for the given year. The third column reports the percentage of the 
number of funds managed by low-dispersion families. The last two columns report the weighted average (the 
difference between fee dispersion within low-dispersion family/strategy groups and the strategy-wide dispersion 
divided by the strategy-wide dispersion level). 
 
 
Investment objective % of families with low dispersion 
% of funds ma-
naged by low-
dispersion families 
Weighted average dispersion reduction 
   Equally weighted Weighted on no. of funds 
Aggressive growth 72.04 75.84 -72.32 -71.52 
Midcaps 43.87 46.86 -61.31 -56.74 
Growth and income 42.92 45.26 -64.72 -59.50 
Growth 52.31 56.41 -58.84 -51.96 
Income and growth 61.29 62.96 -72.45 -69.03 
Small caps 51.62 53.72 -64.01 -58.91 
Total sample 50.51 53.27 -63.36 -57.21 
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Table 6 
Determinants of the expected fee 
This table reports the results of the mean equation from the maximum likelihood estimation of a multiplicative 
heteroscedastic regression. The dependent variable is the expense ratio net of the 12b-1 fees. The right-hand side 
variables capture: (1) The past performance of the fund: the 36-month return of the fund gross of the expense ra-
tio (RET) in models A.1–A.3, the fund’s return ranking in relation to other funds with the same investment objec-
tive (RANK) in models B.1–B.3 and the 36-month 4-factor alpha estimated with the standard Fama, French and 
Carhart factors (ALPHA) in models C.1–C.3; (2) The cost structure of the investment company: the natural loga-
rithm of the fund size (SIZE), the natural logarithm of the fund complex size (ICSIZE) and a dummy variable for 
funds of at least five years of age (AGE); (3) The catering of the fund to heterogeneous clientele: dummy va-
riables for front-end (FR_LOADS), back-end (BACK_LOADS) and level load (LEV_LOADS) funds, the actual 
distribution fees charged by the fund (12b-1) and the ratio between the assets under management at the end of 
year t-1 and the maximum value of the assets under management during year t-1 (Q/MAX); (4) The portfolio 
structure of the fund: the betas of a standard Fama, French and Carhart 4-factor model estimated over the 36 
months (MKT, SMB, HML, UMD), the 36-month standard deviation of the portfolio (DEV), the R2 of a 4-factor 
model (RSQ) estimated over 36 months and the turnover of the fund (TRN). All the explanatory variables are 
lagged with regard to the year when the dependent variable is measured. All the models include investment ob-
jective fixed effects. In order to properly address possible time-related effects, the heteroscedastic model is es-
timated year-by-year à la Fama and MacBeth (1973). The standard errors have been estimated by clustering the 
residuals at the fund level. T-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 




[Table follows on the next page] 
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Table 6 (Description on previous page) 
 
 (A.1) (A.2) (A.3) (B.1) (B.2) (B.3) (C.1) (C.2) (C.3) 
Constant 1.859*** 1.941*** 2.262*** 1.901*** 1.95*** 2.28*** 1.869*** 1.959*** 2.261*** 
 (129.204) (103.940) (34.722) (72.894) (84.379) (33.129) (104.034) (99.420) (35.220) 
RET -0.069 -0.006 0.041       
 (-1.278) (-0.113) (1.036)       
RANK    -0.067** 0.001 -0.021    
    (-1.681) (0.041) (-0.805)    
ALPHA       3.108*** 4.539*** 3.489*** 
       (2.771) (4.113) (3.675) 
SIZE -0.059*** -0.050*** -0.047*** -0.058*** -0.05*** -0.046*** -0.060*** -0.051*** -0.047*** 
 (-20.450) (-23.223) (-23.809) (-19.048) (-18.535) (-18.479) (-20.334) (-19.185) (-19.297) 
ICSIZE -0.042*** -0.048*** -0.043*** -0.042*** -0.048*** -0.043*** -0.041*** -0.048*** -0.043*** 
 (-22.822) (-21.984) (-33.600) (-22.261) (-24.580) (-36.210) (-21.907) (-23.941) (-36.567) 
AGE 0.015** -0.001 0.004 0.014* -0.001 0.005 0.016** -0.001 0.007 
 (1.690) (-0.163) (0.604) (1.530) (-0.101) (0.668) (1.854) (-0.089) (0.899) 
FR_LOADS  0.069*** 0.067***  0.069*** 0.067***  0.068*** 0.067*** 
  (11.311) (11.551)  (10.980) (11.599)  (11.393) (11.684) 
LEV_LOADS  0.093*** 0.081***  0.094*** 0.081***  0.091*** 0.078*** 
  (4.389) (3.319)  (4.554) (3.271)  (4.558) (3.193) 
BACK_LOADS  0.123*** 0.120***  0.123*** 0.119***  0.122*** 0.119*** 
  (7.774) (7.496)  (7.854) (7.452)  (7.836) (7.493) 
12b-1  -2.862 -2.815  -2.838 -2.838  -2.650 -2.828 
  (-1.246) (-1.208)  (-1.235) (-1.231)  (-1.149) (-1.226) 
Q/MAX  -0.146*** -0.118***  -0.142*** -0.111***  -0.158*** -0.128*** 
  (-10.270) (-8.846)  (-9.318) (-7.716)  (-11.664) (-7.414) 
MKT   -0.018   -0.019   -0.013 
   (-0.764)   (-0.844)   (-0.542) 
SMB   0.105***   0.104***   0.104*** 
   (9.117)   (8.463)   (9.793) 
HML   -0.024**   -0.016*   -0.017* 
   (-1.894)   (-1.343)   (-1.359) 
UMD   -0.017   -0.017   -0.010 
   (-0.724)   (-0.761)   (-0.433) 
RSQ   -0.656***   -0.660***   -0.645*** 
   (-8.246)   (-8.009)   (-8.240) 
DEV   1.467***   1.305***   1.381*** 
   (2.869)   (2.537)   (2.671) 
TRN   0.058***   0.058***   0.060*** 
   (13.203)   (13.946)   (13.003) 
Year control variables (CVs) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Investment objective CVs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 26922 26922 26922 26922 26922 26922 26922 26922 26922 
R-squared 0.332 0.365 0.423 0.333 0.365 0.423 0.332 0.366 0.423 
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Table 7 
Univariate tests for search costs and residual fee dispersion 
This table reports the results of F-tests of the equality of variance of residual fees across different samples. Residual 
fees are defined as the residuals of model C.3 in Table 6. In order to avoid bias due to residual time-dependent cross-
correlation, we run the model year-by-year. This table reports the standard deviations of residual fees for funds with 
high search costs and funds with low search costs as well as the variance ratio and the F-stat relative to the test of the 
null hypothesis of the ratio being equal to one. We use five variables as proxies for search costs. The first three are re-
lated to fund visibility: natural logarithms of fund size and investment company size and a dummy variable for funds 
which are at least five years old. For the size-related variables, we define as high-search cost funds those in the lowest 
quartile and as low-search cost funds those in the highest quartile, while for the dummy variable for age, we considered 
old funds as being low-search cost and young funds as being high-search cost. The last two variables are related to the 
fund sales effort: front-end loads and 12b-1 fees. We defined as having high search costs the funds that do not charge 
this kind of fee, and as having low search costs the funds that do. For every test, we report the F-stat. ***, ** and * 









Fund visibility measures 
Log of fund size 0.304 0.225 1.352*** 1.827 
Log of investment 
Company size 0.295 0.239 1.230*** 1.513 
Age 0.279 0.254 1.099*** 1.208 
Sales effort measures         
Front loads 0.267 0.235 1.134*** 1.286 







Residual fee dispersion 
This table reports the results of the variance equation from the maximum likelihood estimation of a multiplicative hete-
roscedastic regression. The dependent variable in the variance equation is the natural logarithm of the squared values of 
the residuals of the mean equation. The right-hand side variables capture: (1) The visibility of the fund: the natural loga-
rithm of the fund size (SIZE), the natural logarithm of the fund complex size (ICSIZE) and a dummy variable which is 
equal to one if the fund has more than five years of past performance (AGE); (2) The sales effort: a dummy variable for 
front-end loads (FR_LOADS) and the actual distribution fees charged by the fund (12b-1). In models A.4 and B.4, we 
also control for: (3) Switching costs: dummy variables for back-end load (BACK_LOADS) and level-load funds 
(LEV_LOADS); (4) Heterogeneity of the managed portfolios including the squared value of the alpha of a 4-factor mod-
el (ALPHA2) and the sum of the squared values of the excess values of the beta of a four-factor model (DIST). We also 
use year and investment objective fixed effects for all of the specifications. All of the explanatory variables are lagged 
with regard to the year when the dependent variable is measured. The structure of the mean equation is that of model 
C.3 in Table 6, except for model B.4 for which we use a piecewise specification in which all of the continuous variables 
in the mean equation are broken into deciles. In model C.4, we use the two-stage version of the Harvey (1976) model 
and cluster the residuals both at the year and at the fund level. In model D.4, the mean and the variance equations are es-
timated separately on a year-by-year basis, while in model E.4 we run a year-by-year simultaneous estimation of the 
two. In both cases, the table reports Fama and MacBeth’s (1973) coefficients and t-statistics for the variance equation. 
The standard errors have been estimated in the first five models by clustering the residuals at the fund level. T-statistics 




  (A.1) (A.2) (A.3) (A.4) (B.4) (C.4) (D.4) (E.4) 
CONSTANT -1.153*** -2.029*** -0.948*** -1.028*** -0.994*** -3.476*** -3.348*** -1.329*** 
 (-3.383) (-7.344) (-2.970) (-3.593) (-3.148) (-21.371) (-21.992) (-7.470) 
SIZE -0.0872***   -0.126*** -0.128*** -0.136*** -0.0765*** -0.0807*** -0.099*** 
 (-4.648)   (-6.594) (-6.763) (-7.110) (-4.463) (-5.629) (-9.048) 
ICSIZE -0.0635***   -0.0430* -0.0393* -0.0545*** -0.00517 -0.0082 -0.058*** 
 (-2.889)   (-1.910) (-1.862) (-2.712) (-0.345) (-0.804) (-6.012) 
AGE -0.169***   -0.172*** -0.172*** -0.155*** -0.182*** -0.103 -0.130** 
 (-3.898)   (-4.025) (-4.063) (-3.601) (-3.411) (-1.362) (-1.946) 
FR_LOADS   -0.253*** -0.290*** -0.298*** -0.255*** -0.259*** -0.142*** -0.253*** 
   (-2.845) (-3.797) (-4.025) (-3.555) (-4.358) (-4.119) (-7.483) 
12B-1   -34.65*** -43.280*** -55.99*** -46.86*** -51.61*** -68.890*** -74.275*** 
   (-4.136) (-5.623) (-5.440) (-4.543) (-5.620) (-8.669) (-8.333) 
LEV_LOADS       0.121 0.109 -0.0346 0.184 0.020 
       (0.934) (0.871) (-0.268) (1.681) 0.0728 
BACK_LOADS       0.187*** 0.147** 0.0443 0.482*** 0.275** 
       (2.845) (2.174) (0.474) (3.227) (2.280) 
ALPHA2       852.2* 625.900 20.90 1.188** 479.114 
       (1.946) (1.432) (0.084) (2.452) (0.794) 
DIST       0.0217*** 0.00803 0.0186*** 0.0599 0.146* 
        (3.322) (1.352) (12.443) (0.757) (1.333) 
Strategy control 
variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time control 









This table reports the expected fee and the mean absolute residual fee calculated with the coefficients estimated in mod-
el A.4 of Table 8 for the mean equation and the variance equation respectively, together with the ratio of the expected to 
the residual fee. Fees are calculated using the median value for each independent variable. The results are averaged 
across years and investment objective groups. For every search cost proxy variable, we estimate two values of the fees: 
(1) High search costs: SIZE, ICSIZE and 12b-1 are at the fifth percentile of their distribution, the AGE and FR_LOADS 
dummy variables are equal to zero and the BACK_LOADS and LEV_LOADS dummy variables are equal to one; and (2) 
Low search costs: SIZE, ICSIZE and 12b-1 are at the 95th percentile of their distribution, the AGE and FR_LOADS 
dummy variables are equal to one and the BACK_LOADS and LEV_LOADS dummy variables are equal to zero. The last 
two columns report the percentage change of the residual fee and the ratio of the residual to the expected fee if a fund 








Ratio   Residual fee Ratio 
 High SC Low SC  High SC Low SC  High SC Low SC  % change % change 
SIZE 1.046 0.821  0.338 0.240  0.324 0.292  41.0 10.8 
ICSIZE 1.167 0.839  0.321 0.279  0.275 0.333  14.8 -17.5 
AGE 0.940 0.952  0.319 0.293  0.339 0.308  9.0 10.3 
FR_LOADS 0.952 1.009  0.293 0.252  0.308 0.250  16.1 23.1 
12b-1 0.948 0.964  0.314 0.237  0.332 0.246  32.3 34.6 
LEV_LOADS 0.999 0.952  0.311 0.293  0.311 0.308  5.9 1.2 




Asymmetry of residual fee dispersion 
This table reports the results of a multinomial logistic regression in which the response variable is able to assume three 
different values depending on whether the residual fee of the fund is (1) in the top quintile of the distribution; (2) in the 
bottom quintile of the distribution; or (3) in the central part of the distribution (the base case). The residual fee has been 
estimated using model C.3 in Table 6 via a quintile regression approach. In order to avoid bias due to residual time-
dependent cross-correlations, we run the model on a year-by-year basis. The right-hand side variables of the logistic 
model capture: (1) The visibility of the fund: the natural logarithm of the fund size (SIZE), the natural logarithm of the 
fund complex size (ICSIZE) and a dummy variable for funds of at least five years of age (AGE); (2) The sales effort: a 
dummy variable for front-end loads (FR_LOADS) and the actual distribution fees charged by the fund (12b-1); (3) 
Switching costs: dummy variables for back-end load (BACK_LOADS) and level load (LEV_LOADS) funds. We also 
used year and investment objective control variables. All the explanatory variables are lagged with regard to the year 
when the dependent variable is measured. The third column reports the difference between the coefficients in the first 
two columns together with a chi-squared statistic on this difference being different from zero. ***, ** and * represent 




 (1) (2) (3) 
 Top quintile Bottom quintile Difference 
SIZE -0.103*** -0.0549*** -0.048*** 
 (-8.963) (-4.814) (11.690) 
ICSIZE 0.0123 0.00453 0.008 
 (1.474) (0.544) (0.590) 
AGE -0.102** -0.228*** 0.126** 
 (-2.278) (-5.139) (5.560) 
FR_LOADS -0.161*** -0.365*** 0.204*** 
 (-4.483) (-9.799) (20.500) 
12b-1 -44.140*** -71.65*** 27.510*** 
 (-7.088) (-11.348) (12.930) 
LEV_LOADS -0.0531 0.0948 -0.148 
 (-0.609) (1.055) (1.810) 
BACK_LOADS 0.0880* 0.154*** -0.066 
 (1.867) (3.283) (1.350) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
